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RÉSUMÉ 
Depuis la fin des accords de Bretton Woods, les taux de change réels ont af­
fiché de grandes et persistantes fluctuations. Ces fluctuations se sont avérées difficiles 
à expliquer, tant de manière théorique qu'empirique. Ce mémoire utilise une approche 
d'autorégression structurelle de vecteurs pour (i) identifier les chocs fondamentaux qui 
expliquent la plus grande partie des fluctuations du taux de change réel; (ii) quanti­
fier l'impact que ces chocs ont sur d'autres agrégats macroéconomiques prédominants; 
et (iii) documenter les différences de ces chocs pour les pays industrialisés et les pays 
émergents. 
Nous analysons un échantillon de cinq pays: le Canada, le Mexique, l'Afrique du Sud, 
la Thaïlande et les États-Unis. Nos principaux résultats sont les suivants: (i) les fluctu­
ations du taux de change sont menées par un seul choc majeur; (ii) ce choc ressemble le 
plus à un choc de demande; et (iii) le détachement du taux de change est plus fort dans 
les pays émergents que dans les pays industrialisés. En outre, notre analyse confirme 
que ni la parité du pouvoir d'achat, ni la parité du taux d'intérêt découvert ne tiennent. 
ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the Bretton Woods agreement, real exchange rates have exhibited 
large and persistent fluctuations. Both theoretically and empirically, these fluctuations 
have proved hard to explain. This thesis uses a structural vector autoregression ap­
proach (i) to identify the fundamental shocks that explain the most of the fluctuations 
of the real exchange rate; (ii) to quant ify the impact these shocks have on other promi­
nent macroeconomic aggregates; and (iii) to document differences of these shocks for 
industrialized and emerging countries. 
We analyze a panel of five countries: Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand and the 
United States. Our main results are the following: (i) exchange rate fluctuations are 
primarily driven by one single shock; (ii) this shock resembles most a demand shock; 
and (iii) the exchange-rate disconnect is stronger in emerging than in industrialized 
countries. Furthermore, our analysis confirms that neither purchasing-power parity nor 
uncovered-interest-rate parity hold. 
INTRODUCTION
 
Exchange rate fluctuations are among the most studied phenomena in macroeco­
nomics. Understanding their origins is important as they have an impact on economic 
stability, transnational investment, trade and exchange rate arrangements and mone­
tary policy. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement, exchange rate volatility 
increased substantially (Mussa, 1986) and displays persistent deviations form standard 
theories as purchasing-power parity (Dornbusch, 1980) or uncovered-interest-rate parity 
(Campbell and Clarida, 1987) Furthermore, exchange rates do not share the common 
dynamics with core macroeconomic variables which is referred to as the exchange-rate­
disconnect puzzle (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). 
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Figure 0.1 Display of the Exchange Rate Disconnect 
Figure 0.1 shows the log CanadianjU.S. real exchange rate (rExR) with three 
core macroeconomic variables: the log-differential (ratio) in priee levels (P-diff), the 
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differential of short-term interest rates (R-diff) and the log-differential of output (Y­
diff). Ali variables are normalized to one. Our monthly data ranges from 1973m5 until 
2006m2. The gray shades indicate periods when the disconnect is particularly visible. 
This thesis attempts to identify sources and cross-country differences of real ex­
change rate volatility in the post-Bretton Woods era. Our three main objectives are 
to (i) determine the most influential economic shocks for the real exchange rate; to 
(ii) quantify the impact of these shocks on other macroeconomic variables; and to (iii) 
document the difference between industrialized and emerging countries. 
Our methodological approach consists of a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) 
open macro model that contains six equations. We apply an econometric method which 
is based on the statistical identification procedure outlined by Uhlig (2003). Accord­
ingly, we first determine the most influential -unlabeled- shocks and their impact on 
the forecast-error variance of the exchange rate. In a second step, we label these shocks 
according to the responses they provoke in our variables. The advantage of this sequence 
is that we are sure to find the shocks which drive the most of the real exchange rate. 
The challenge we face is to label the shocks correctly. 
Earlier work on exchange rate volatility using SVARs applies theoretical identi­
fication procedures ta first label shocks and determine their influence afterwards. The 
problem with this approach is that the choice of theoretical restrictions necessarily has 
an influence on the results; researchers identify the shocks by applying some informa­
tion ordering and alter the restrictions until the impulse-response functions match with 
conventional wisdom. This problem is clearly pointed out in the literature (Cochrane, 
1994; Uhlig, 2005) and we hope to avoid it by applying an atheoretical approach. 
Our system of equations contains six variables in cross-country differentials: the 
real exchange rate, output, the interest-rate spread, the price level, the monetary-policy 
instrument and the stock-market index. We use monthly and quarterly data from 
Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand and the USA for the data horizon 1973-2006. 
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Applying the statistical identification procedure, we generate the fo11owing results: 
(i) there is essentia11y one shock driving the real exchange rate to over 90% and its impact 
on the real exchange rate is strongest after a lag of three months; (ii) our impulse­
response functions show that the effect of this shock on our SVAR resembles most a 
demand shock; (iii) the exchange-rate disconnect exists in a11 countries analyzed but 
appears to be greater in emerging countries; and (iv) neither purchasing-power parity 
nor uncovered-interest-rate parity hold. 
The present work extends the existing SVAR literature on exchange rate fluctua­
tions by proposing a new identification method and applying it to a new country panel. 
Earlier research was based on theoretical identification procedures and focused exclu­
sively on industrialized countries. Our results support some earlier work and contradicts 
other. Clarida and Galf (1994) find evidence for demand shocks, Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1995) consider only monetary shocks and Gauthier and Tessier (2002) advocate supply 
shocks. Our worle yields similar results to Clarida and Galf (1994) and we clearly ru le 
out monetary and supply shocks. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as fo11ows. Chapter 1 reviews the exist­
ing literature. Chapter 2 provides an overview of traditional econometric methods and 
explains different identification procedures. Chapter 3 presents our empirical specifica­
tions. Chapter 4 discusses results on the sources of the shocks and chapter 5 compares 
the difference to emerging countries. A conclusion completes this thesis. 
CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Throughout the last three decades research on exchange rate volatility has been 
very active, resulting in a vast literature and five principal approaches (MacDonald, 
1998). We follow the line of research applying structural vector autoregression models 
(SVARs) to untangle exogenous shocks from general equilibrium movements of macro 
variables. Advances in econometrics offer improved and promising tools to address par­
ticularly two key questions. Specifically, (i) what shocks cause fluctuations of exchange 
rates?; and (ii) can the data be reconciled with existing theories? 
Three different sources are being advocated: Demand shocks (Clarida and Gali, 1994; 
Weber, 1997), monetary shocks (Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995; Faust and Rogers, 1999) 
and supply shocks (Alexius, 2000; Gauthier and Tessier, 2002). Here, we provide a short 
overview about the objectives, methods and results of these papers. 
Clarida and Gall (1994) is the pioneer work in this !ine of research. They focus 
on nominal shocks to the exchange rate but take demand and supply shocks into con­
sideration. Four industrialized countries are examined: Canada, Germany, Japan and 
the United Kingdom. The reference country is the USA. They use quarterly data for 
the horizon 1973q3 until 1992q1 to build a SVAR containing three variables in first­
differences: the real exchange rate, the differential of price levels and the differential of 
output. The identification procedure to impose long-run restrictions follows Blanchard 
and Quah (1989): A monetary shock bas no long-run effect on output nor the real 
exchange rate and a demand shock has no long-run effect on output. For the German 
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and Japanese case, about 50% and 35% of forecast-error variance of the real exchange 
rate in the short-run «one year) are caused by monetary shocks. For Canada and the 
United Kingdom monetary shocks seem to have no importance, as they explain less 
than 1% and 1,3% respectively. A second finding is that the time horizon may be an 
important factor: The German data reveals that in the late 1970s more than 50% of 
real exchange rate fluctuations were due to monetary shocks, whereas in the early 1980s 
the majority is due to demand shocks. They also find that the expected sum of future 
interest differentials does not explain much to real exchange rate fluctuations, mean­
ing that uncovered-interest-rate parity (UIP) fails. Their main conclusion is: Demand 
shocks are the predominant factor behind real exchange rate volatility; over 90% for the 
Canadian case. Monetary shocks are important in sorne countries only. Supply shocks 
do not have a significant impact. 
Weber (1997) refines Clarida and Galf's work. The main improvement is the split­
ting of supply shocks into labor supply shocks and productivity shocks and of monetary 
shocks into money demand and money supply shocks. This offers the ability to quantify 
the responses of the VAR variables to five instead of only three different shocks. Five 
variables are used to build a SVAR: the real exchange rate, the differential of output, the 
differential of real money, the differential of price levels and the differential of employ­
ment. The data set is extended to the sample 1972m8 until 1994m12 and the analysis 
is limited to three countries: Germany, Japan and the USA. There is no fixed reference 
country as rotating the countries results in three combinations: USA/GER, USA/JAP 
and GER/J AP. Long-run restrictions to identify the SVAR are chosen from Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) and Shapiro and Watson (1989): demand shocks, monetary demand 
shocks and money supply shocks have no effect on neither output nor employment. Both 
monetary shocks have no effect on the real exchange rate and monetary supply shocks 
have no impact on real money balances. Supply shocks have no impact on employ­
ment. The findings are that most of forecast-error variance of the real exchange rate 
(in short-run) can be attributed to demand shocks (60%-85%), much less to monetary 
shocks (10%-20%) and virtually none to supply shocl<s. This confirms the conclusion of 
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Clarida and Galf (1994). Interestingly, about 35% of the real exchange rate fluctuations 
in Japan in the long-l'un seem to be due to labor supply shocks. 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) contribute the second fundamental work. They 
only address the question of how important monetary shocks are for real exchange 
rate fluctuations. Theil' analysis is based on the following five industrialized countries: 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom. The USA serves as the ref­
erence country. They use monthly data for the sample horizon 1974m1 until 1990m5 
to construct a seven-variable SVAR. The variables are the real exchange rate, the U.S. 
output, the foreign output, the D.S. short-term interest rate, the foreign short-term 
interest rate, the U.S. price level and a U.S. monetary policy measurement. 1 The mon­
etary policy measurement captures the nominal shock. It rotates, taking the form of 
three different sources: the log-differential of non-borrowed reserves over total reserves 
(NBRX), the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) and dummy variables capturing Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) meetings that lead to large monetary interventions. 2 The 
identification procedure applied follows Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) which iso­
lates measures of exogenous shocks to monetary policy: they impose that a monetary 
shock has a contemporaneous impact only on the U.S. short-term interest rate and the 
real exchange rate but on other variable in their SVAR. The main results are that a con­
tractionary monetary shock leads to persistent and significant appreciations of the real 
exchange rate. Monetary policy shocks explain between 10% and 40% of the forecast­
error variance of the real exchange rate, depending on the policy instrument and the 
country analyzed. The impacts of the shocks are maximal after approximately three 
years. Furthermore, they find that UIP is viobtcd for several periods after the shock. 
Faust and Rogers (1999) ex tend Eichenbaum and Evans's work to a 14-variable 
IThey use the real- as weil as the nominal exchange rate, but show that this choice does not 
have a significant impact on the results. Theil' analysis is donc with the l'cal cxchange rate. 
2The FOMe measurement refcrs to observations inicially made by Friedman and Schwartz (1971) 
which were carried on by Ramer and Ramer (1990). 
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SVAR. Theil' SVAR consists of the real exchange rate, U.S. and foreign output, U.S. and 
foreign priees, commodity priees, U.S. and foreign money supplies, U.S. non-borrowed 
reserves, U.S. total reserves, U.S. and foreign short and long-term interest rates. They 
use the same setting as Eichenbaum and Evans, thus regarding only a monetary shock 
over the sampIe horizon 1974m1 until 1990m5, but limit themselves to the cases of 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Theil' method differs mainly in the restrictions 
as they argue that the proposed restrictions by Eichenbaum and Evans are not very 
creditable and instead follow Faust (1998) to employ sign restrictions: an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate goes along with an increase in interest rates and with a decrease 
in ail other variables considered. According to their findings, the U.S. monetary shock 
accounts for less of the real exchange rate fluctuation in the 14-variable SVAR (2%-30%) 
than in the replicated seven-variable SVAR (8%-56%). A conclusion they draw from this 
is that the smaller model might omit important variables. Furthermore, they are able 
to reproduce the large deviations from UIP already found by Eichenbaum and Evans. 
Alexius (2000) advocates supply shocks being the main driving force after study­
ing four industrialized countries: Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and the USA. 
There is no fixed reference country but rotation results in six country combinations: 
USA/GER, USAI JAP, GER/JAP, UK/ JAP, UK/GER and UK/USA. Alexius builds 
a four-variable SVAR with the nominal exchange rate, the differential of output, the 
differential of government consumption as a share of output and the differential of priee 
levels. The data horizon is 1960q1 until 1998q4. Four shocks are being considered: 
monetary shocks, supply shocks, demand shocks and transitory shocks. They impose 
the following long-l'un restrictions: monetary shocks do not affect output nor govern­
ment spending but exchange rates. Demand shocks do not affect output. Supply shocks 
do not affect government spending. The results reveal that in the short-run transitory 
shocks dominate (37%-76%), in the medium-run monetary shocks dominate (7%-40%) 
and in the long-l'un supply shocks dominate (6%-57%). Demand shocks never play a 
major l'ole. Dependent on the model used, the researcher finds for five of six country 
combinations that about 60% until 90% of the long-l'un forecast-error variance are due 
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to supply shocks. 
Gauthier and Tessier (2002) propose work towards the supply-shock theory, too. 
They concentrate on the Canadian economy for the sample range 1961q1 until 1990q4 
to construct a structural Vector Error Correction Model (SVECM) with six variables: 
the real exchange rate, real commodity priees, the differential of output per capita, 
the differential of government spending to output and the differential of interest rates. 
Their analysis considers four different shocks: monetary, demand, supply and transitory. 
They use the King-Plosser-Stock-Watson (1991) identification proeedure which imposes 
long-run restrictions: output shocks and (government spending) demand shocks do not 
affect commodity prices. Only commodity price shocks and supply shocks have an 
impact on output. The main finding is that supply shocks are the dominant factor for 
real exchange rate volatility at al! horizons; particularly in the long-run (>five years), 
when they account for over 60% of the forecast-error variance of the real exchange rate. 
In the short-run (one year) they explain 39% and in the medium-run (two to five years) 
still 34% on average. In contrast, monetary shocks contribute 27% in the short-run, 
26% in the medium-run and zero percent in the long-run. Even demand shocks add 
more to real exchange rate volatility: 14% in short-run, 25% in medium-run and 39% 
in the long-run. 
Without putting these papers in more direct competition, we would like to recon­
sider some facts. First, the SVAR approach has been proven useful but the identification 
procedure is a critical choiee as results often depend on ad-hoc restrictions. Second, dif­
ferent results do as weil stem from the country choice and the time horizon considered. 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
The approach used by the papers cited above consists of building a VAR, applying 
sorne theoretical identification procedure and sorting out the effect of one or several 
shocks. Our objective is different. As there is reason to think that the restrictions which 
stem from theoretical identification procedures have a strong impact on the results, we 
avoid imposing such restrictions. We identify the shocks statistically and then try to 
interpret and label the shocks according to their impact on our SVAR. The advantage 
is that we are sure to find the most important shocks on the real exchange rate. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that labeling the shocks may be more difficult. 
2.1 Standard VAR Theory 
As stated above, SVARs have proven useful in the context of analyzing exoge­
nous shocks within a system of simultaneously determined variables. In comparison 
to macroeconometric micro-founded models, SVARs make few assumptions about the 
underlying structure of the economy and focus on deriving a good ~tatistical represen­
tation of the interactions between the variables. The assumption they make though is 
that macroeconomic dynamics in reality are weil represented by a VAR; moreover by 
definition, the shocks are uncorrelated. They are particularly useful for two objectives: 
to forecast values of variables and to examine the different responses of variables to 
common economic shocks. 
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Technically, SVARs are dynamic systems of equations that describe the relations 
between interrelated variables and structural uncorrelated exogenous shocks. They have 
the following structure: the current value of each variable in the system depends on 
its own and on ail other variables in the system; each variable is expressed by one 
equation which explains the endogenous variable as a linear combination of an intercept 
(constant), its own lagged (autoregressed) values, actual and lagged values of the other 
variables and an error term (innovation). 
To illustrate, consider the following dynamic system of equations representing a 
simple bivariate SVAR with one lag: 
x xx + yx yx xXt = c + al Xt-1 a o Yt+aj Yt-l + ét 
y yy xy xy y
Yt = c + al Yt-l +ao Xt + al Xt-l + é t 
where x and y are interrelated variables, the c's are intercepts, the a's are slope coeffi­
cients and the é'S are structural shocks that are supposed to be uncorrelated with each 
other and over time, i.e. E[éféf] = 0 \ft. 
The structural economic exogenous shock is the unexplained movement in the 
variable. The influence of a shock is expressed by the change in the forecast-error 
variance of the variables in the periods following the shock. Hence, the researcher 
determines the effect on the variance of each variable in the SVAR. In the favorable case 
a substantial fraction of the forecast-error variance is explained. This is the principal 
criterion to measure the relevance of the employed approach and the candidate variables 
chosen. 
The problem with simultaneously determined variables -and hence with SVARs­
is that the direction of causation is not clear: variable x determines y and in the same 
period y de termines x. Consequently, one cannot estimate the system without making 
further assumptions. To show how to proceed, consider the bivariate SVAR again, this 
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time stated in matrix form: 
[Xt-l] + [C~] (2.1 ) Yt-l Ct 
Redefining the vec to, of vaciabl" [::] as q;, and the a- mat,ices as A0 and AI yicld, 
the fol\owing, compact form: 
(2.2) 
For ease of notation we drop the constants at this stage. l 
The problem lies in the presence of the contemporary variables, captured by the 
Ao-matrix. To show how to determine the contemporary values, we further transform 
the equation. 
We redefine the product of the matrices AÜI Al == BI, 
The lagged values are condensed by the lag-operator: BI lPt-1 == BILlPt. 
The hypothesis that the VAR is stationary allows inversion.2 
1Our Matlab program takcs them into accollnt though. 
2This means tha.t its values f1uctuate around a (natural) fixed value which is theoretically cx­
pressed by a long-nm general cquilibriurn (stcady state). We make this hypothesis in accordance with 
the cornrnon economic Jiteraturc. 
12 
Redefinition of [1 - B1Ll- 1 == C(L) eventually yields the (structural) vector moving 
average representation of a SVAR: 
C(L)Aü1Ct (2.3) 
R(L)ct· (2.4) 
Written in matrix form: 
C(L)ll C(Lh2] [AO;ll AO;12]-1
= (2.5) 
[[::]	 C(Lh1 C(Lh2 AO;21 AO;22 
R(L)ll R(Lh2] [cthOCk1] (2.6) 
[R(Lb R(Lb cthOck2 
At this stage, one can obtain the residuals Ut and thus the variance-covariance 
matrix of the residuals V by estimating the reduced-form VAR with the ordinary-least­
squares (OLS) method. The R-matrix is to be determined but as it is the result of 
the product containing AÜ1 it still depends on contemporary (unknown) values and the 
calculus of Ao is not evident. Consider the relation between the residuals Ut and Ao 
which is a linear combination of unknown structural shocks c( 
- A-1 Ut = 0 ct·	 (2.7) 
Ivlultiplying each side with u~ yields 
or equivalently 
(2.8) 
where V is the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals Ut and 2:; is the variance-
covariance matrix of the structural shocks ct. Assuming that the variance-covariance 
matrix of the structural shocks is normalized to one (2:; = 1) yields 
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The Ao-matrix contains n 2 unknown, non-identical elements. Due to symmetry, 
the V-matrix has n(n2+1) known, non-identical elements. That means we have to impose 
n(~-l) restrictions on Ao to solve equation 2.8. 
2.2 Theoretical Identification Procedures 
The specifie sets of restrictions to identify the link between the shock and the 
residual are called identification procedures. There are two classes of identification 
procedures which distinguish themselves by the time horizon on which they are imposed. 
2.2.1 Short-Run-Restrictions 
Identification procedures involving short-run restrictions capture the idea that a 
shock j may not have an effect on a specifie variable x at the time the shock occurs. 
The variable x is not directly affected by the shock j but it might be affected with 
a lag. To see how short-run restrictions are imposed consider equation 2.5 again. As 
short-run restrictions influence contemporary values, we impose them on the Ao-matrix. 
1'As shown above, with E[été~] = I; = 1 we get V = AD1AD which provides n(~+l) 
known elements of the Ao-matrix.3 To completely identify Ao, we have to impose 
n(~-l) more restrictions on the elements of the Ao-matrix 4 These (imposed) restrictions 
are motivated by conventional wisdom which states a relation between a shock and a 
variable. For example, if the variable x is not affected by shock 2 in the short-run the 
researcher imposes A O;l2 = O. 
Example: Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) use the Christiano and Eichenbaum 
(1992) identification procedure to impose short-run restrictions. As presented in the 
literature review, their SVAR contains seven variables, only one labeled shock and can 
be written in the following form: 
3For this bivariate case, this formula yields three known clements of Ao. 
4For the SVAR exposed, the formula inclicates that only one more restriction is necdccl. 
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US-Yt C(L)ll C(L)17 AO;ll A O;17 éfhockl 
US- Pt C(Lb C(Lh7 A O;21 A O;27 éfhock2 
foreign ­ Yi C(Lb C(Lh7 A O;31 AO;37 éfhock3 
foreign - Rt C(L)41 C(L)47 A O;41 A O;47 éfhock4 
US - MPIt C(L)Sl C(L)S7 A O;Sl A O;S7 M onetaryShock é t 
US-Rt C(L)61 C(L)67 A O;61 AO;67 éfhock6 
rExRt C(L)71 C(L)77 7x7 A O;71 A O;77 7x7 
éShock7 
t 
They impose 20 restrictions which depend heavily on the ordering of variables, 
particularly on the position of the D.S. monetary-policy instrument and the monetary 
shock. Specifically: 
(1) Shocl< 2 has no short-run effect on D.S. output (A O;12 = 0).
 
(2-3) Shock 3 has no short-run effect on D.S. output (AO;13 = 0) and the D.S. priee level
 
(AO;23 = 0). 
(4-6) Shock 4 has no short-run effect on D.S. output (A O;14 = 0), the D.S. price level
 
(A O;24 = 0) and foreign output (AO;34 = 0).
 
(7-10) The monetary shock has no short-run effect on D.S. output (AO;15 = 0), the D.S.
 
priee level (AO;25 = 0), foreign output (AO;35 = 0) and the D.S. interest rate (A O;45 = 0).
 
(11-15) Shock 6 has no short-run effect on D.S. output (AO;16 = 0), the D.S. price level
 
(A O;26 = 0), foreign output (AO;36 = 0), the D.S. interest rate (AO;46 = 0) and the D.S.
 
monetary-policy instrument (AO;56 = 0).
 
(16-20) Shock 7 has no short-run effect on D.S. output (AO;17 = 0), the D.S. price level
 
(A O;27 = 0), foreign output (A O;37 = 0), the D.S. interest rate (A O;47 = 0) and the D.S.
 
monetary-policy instrument (AO;57 = 0).
 
For a graphieal display see the right part of figure 4.6 showing the impulse­
response functions. 
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2.2.2 Long-Run Restrictions 
An identification procedure imposing long-run restriction is based on the idea that 
a shock j may have an effect on variable x at the time of the shock and thereafter, but 
does not have a permanent impact. Otherwise said: a variable x is directly affected by 
the shock j and immediately changes its value but returns to its initial (natural) value 
in the long-run. An example is the case that a monetary shock has no effect on output 
growth in the long-run (llmoney is neutral ll ). This means that the researcher does not 
restrict the Ao-matrix -as Ao captures the contemporary values- but the R-matrix. The 
lag polynomial R(L) can be written as R(L) = L:r=o RhLh. Long-run restrictions are 
imposed on sum of the elements of the R-matrix which is R(l) = L:r=o Rh, 
Example: Clarida and Gall (1994) use the Blanchard and Quah (1989) identifi­
cation procedure involving long-run restrictions. As presented in the literature review, 
their SVAR contains three variables and can be written in the following form: 
S1.JpptyShocky - difft R(L)ll R(L)12 R(L)J3 Ct 
cDemandShockrExRt R(Lb R(Lb R(L)23 
[ ~l onetaryShockP - dif ft R(Lhl R(Lb R(Lh3 Ct 
The three restrictions they impose are: 
(1) Demand shocks have no long-run effect on the output differential: R(1)J2 = 0 
(2) Monetary shocks have no long-run effect on the output differential: R(1)13 = 0 
(3) Monetary shocks have no long-run effect on the rExR: R(lh3 = a 
Consequently, the upper triangle of the R-matrix is zero anù as a result, the 
effects of shocks on the concerned variables will fade out. For a graphical display see 
figure 4.4 showing the impulse-response functions. 
vVe resume that many theoretical identification procedures -employing short and 
long-run restrictions- have been developed to determine the remaining elements. 5 Un­
"Cf.: Sims (1980), I31anchard and Quah (1989), King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991), Chris­
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fortunately, restrictions are often based on economically implausible assumptions as 
Cooley and LeRoy (1985) point out or depend on some (abitrary) ordering of the vari­
ables (Uhlig, 2005). As a result, researchers strive to impose widely accepted restrictions. 
Nevertheless, as stated in the literature review, the results seem to depend heavily on 
the restrictions imposed. 
2.3 A Statistical Identification Procedure 
In this thesis, we employa statistical identification procedure which is developed 
by Uhlig (2003), who calls it an agnostic approach. We will refer to it as the Uhlig 
method. The main idea is to seek shocks that maximize the forecast-error variance 
of the real exchange rate; we therefore decompose the variance. Once the shocks are 
determined, we analyze their impact on our SVAR in order to gain information about 
the origin of the shocks. This step is based on impulse-response functions. Here an 
outline how it works mathematically. We present the two main steps of this approach. 
Disaggregate the Shacks ta the System 
Our objective is to dismantle the shocks captured by the variance-covariance 
matrix. Ta establish a link between the source of the shock and the forecast-error 
variance, we have to determine the structural shocks ét behind the residuals Ut. As 
mentioned before by equation 2.7, the residuals Ut can be built by the Ao-matrix and 
the structural shocks ét as 
Ut = A 0 - I ét 
where the Ao-matrix has the property AÜI AÜII = V with V representing the variance­
covariance matrix of the residuals Ut. The relation between the residual and the shock 
is established by the Ao-matrix which transmits the shocks. 
Given that we are only interested in the shocks that lead to the greatest fiuc­
tiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Galf (1992), Dernankc and Mihov (1995), Sims and Zha (1996), Chris­
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) 
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tuations of the forecast-error variance, we can limit our search to a submatrix of 
1Ao = [A j Ah]' We concentrate on the submatrix A j which is called the impulse 
matrix. With this specification, our problem consists of solving 
A- 1Ujt = j éjt· 
Before moving on, we facilitate the calculus by the Cholesky decomposition (fac­
torization)G We decompose the Ao-matrix so that Ao = AoQ where Q is the orthog­
onal matrix to A with the property QQ' = J. Ao is a matrix of Ao with the property 
Ao1A01l = V. Relating this to the previous paragraph yields At = Aj lQj. Accord­
ingly, we get 
The SVAR representation given by equation 2.3 
in combination with equation 2.7 can be written as 
<Pt = C(L)Ut. 
and introducing the impulse-response functions 7 R(L) = C(L)Ao1 yields 
GThe Cbolesky decomposition of V yields a matrix Ji which has three useful properties: (i) the 
lower triangle of Ji is zero; (ii) ÀA'=V; and (iii) A=AQ. Cf. Hamilton (1994), pages 91,147 or Greene 
(2003), page 832 
lCf. section 2.4 in this thcsis, Wickens and Motto (2001) or Hamilton (1994), page 318 
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With R(L) = R(L)Q, we can calculate the variance-covariance matrix of the 
(forecast) prediction error8 The k-period-ahead (forecast) prediction error Ut+k of <Pt+k 
is given by 
k k 
Ut+k = LR1ét+k-l = LRlQét-k-l' (2.9) 
1=0 1=0 
The variance-covariance matrix of the prediction error is 
k k
 
~(k) = Ut+kU~+k = L RlQét+k-lé~+k_lQ' R; = L RlR; (2.10)
 
l=O l=O
 
and can be divided into m pairs 
m m k 
~(k) = L ~(k,j) = L L(Rlqj)(Rlqj)' (2.11) 
j=l j=l 1=0 
which provides us the ;th shock corresponding to the ;th prediction error Ut+j, giving 
the variance-covariance matrix of the prediction error ~(k) = Ut+jU~+j.9 
The Most Influential Shocks 
After having elaborated the link between the source of a shock Uj and its impact 
on the variance-covariance matrix ~(k) of the prediction error Ut+k we strive to find 
the shocks which exert the strongest influence on the VAR. This consists of finding the 
impulse matrix A j , transmitting the shocks of the shocks Uj which explain most of the 
variation of the variance-covariance matrix. 
First of ail, we limit our prediction horizon to k = [k,k]. These upper and lower 
bounds indicate the number of periods considered. The impulse matrix which explains 
most of the fluctuations of thc variancc-covariancc matrix maximizes 
k 
2 - '"'" (J' (k, k) = ~ ~(k)jj 
k=k 
Sef. section 2.4 in this thesis or Greene (2003), page Ill, 576 
9Note that for k = 0: (i) the prediction error equals thc residual IUt+k = ut! and (ii) the 
variance-covariance matrix of the prediction error equals the variance-covariance matrix of the residual 
[2:(k) = VI. 
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which can be reduced to the lh impulse matrix Ar 
k k 
(1;05, k; ql) = L:.>L:trace[Ejj(R{qI)(Riqdl = q~Sql 
k=~ 1=0 
where ql is the an eigenvector of S which is short for S = L~=k L~=o R;EjjR1.10 E 
stands for the expected value. 
We solve the given optimization problem, subject to the constraint q~ ql = 1, to 
maximize the variance of the lh impulse matrix executing the Lagrangian technique on 
the objective function: 
The first order condition we are interested in is g~ = 0 and is given by 
This relation reveals that the eigenvector ql has the eigenvalue À. ll Bence, the 
maximal variance is given by the eigenvector with the maximal eigenvalue. This means 
finding the first principal component 
or -if expressed for several shocks- in more general writing12 : 
The first and second principal components provide the two most influencing, 
exogenous shocks on the VAR. Identifying these shocks will amount to finding the shocks 
corresponding to the largest eigenvalues. As each shock cannot be connected to a single 
IOCr. Hamilton (1994), page 729 or Johnston and DiNardo (1997), page 476-478 
11 Cr. Greene (2003), page 827 
12Cr. Greene (2003), page 58 
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eigenvalue, we have to find the combination of eigenvalues which generates the maximal 
total variance. As there may be several such combinations of shocks, we have to consider 
several variance decompositions. Let the vedor al represent the shock corresponding 
to the largest eigenvalue )'1 and a2 represent the orthogonal shock corresponding to the 
second largest eigenvalue À2. We may then find pairs of shocks [a(G); a(G + ~)], where 
a(G) = cos(G * i~)al + sin(G * ;~)a2, which represent orthogonal decompositions. G 
takes the values {0;30;60;90;120;150} yielding threé~ orthogonal pairings, which we cali 
rotations henceforth: 
(i) al (G = 0) and a2(8 = 90) 
(ii) al (8 = 30) and a2(G = 120) 
(iii) al(8 = 60) and a2(G = 150). 
2.4 Analytical Tools 
For the interpretation of the results obtained with VARs, two instruments are 
very useful: the calculus of impulse-response functions and the variance decomposition. 
Both show the relation between a variable and a shock as stated in the equations 2.5 
and 2.6. For a concrete example see chapter 4. Here, we provide a short introduction 
on how to use and understand these tools. 
Impulse-response functions trace out how a single, exogenous shock affects a vari­
able under the assumption that no other shock occurs at that time and thereafter. 
Initially, one supposes that the model -i.e. ail variables- is in its (natural) equilibrium. 
The values of the variables are fixed and consequently there is no fluctuation. This 
changes at the occurrence of the shock at time ta: the variable directly affected by 
the shock shows an immediate response by changing its value. This change is usually 
measured by the percentage fluctuation of the variable. Most commonly, response func­
1:!To bc exact, there are six orthogonal pairings. We abstraet from the latter three 
{180;210;240;270;300;330} as they do not contain any new information and are only different in sign. 
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tions are portrayed in graphical form. The axis of abscissae contains the k-step-ahead 
prediction (time) horizon which starts in ta and depicts how the variable evaluates in 
the k-periods following the shock. A shock can have a positive or a negative effect and 
a temporary or a permanent effect on a variable. 
The second tool is the variance decomposition which states how much of the 
forecast-error variance of a variable can be explained by a specific shock. The researcher 
generally supposes that a variable is stationary meaning that it has a fixed (natural) 
value in equilibrium. The variance of such a variable gives the deviation of that (natural) 
value if the variable is exogenously influenced by a non-systematic shock. Often, there 
is reason to think that several (unknown) shocks influence the variables. In that case 
the impacts of different shocks sum up to compose the total variance. 
A variance decomposition offers the possibility to decompose the (total) variance 
to see how many shocks influence the variable and to what extent (explanatory power in 
percent). Therefore, the variance decomposition can also be seen as a R2 measurement. 
Commonly it is shown as a graph. The axis of abscissae contains the k-step-ahead 
prediction (time) horizon. The prediction horizon shows how the impact of a shock 
evolves over time as shocks may gain importance after a number of lags. 
CHAPTER III 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
This chapter outlines the buildup of our SVAR. We define the countries analyzed 
(section 1) and provide motivation for the variables we choose (section 2). Furthermore, 
we explain the data set (section 3) and finally assemble our SVAR in explicit matrix 
form. 
3.1 Country Panel 
As the researchers cited in the literature review, we strive to obtain robustness by 
generating results for several countries. The vast majority of researchers chose among 
Japan, Western European and North American countries. In this thesis we also pro­
pose an analysis of three emerging countries: the United Mexican States (MEX), the 
Republic of South Africa (RSA) and the Kingdom of Thailand (THL). 
As a benchmark, we first analyze Canada (CAN), an industrialized country. This has 
three reasons and advantages: (i) we are able to hark back on more extensive and re­
liable data; (ii) we can compare our results -obtained with a statistical identification 
procedure- ta results achieved with methods implying theoretical identification proce­
dures which used Canadian data as well; and (iii) we are able to compare our results 
for emerging countries ta those for an industrialized country. Following the pertinent 
literature we choose the United States of America (USA) as the reference country. 
23 
3.2 Variable Choice 
The target variable is the real exchange rate for which we maximize the forecast­
error variance. 1 The other variables of the VAR are chosen according to their appearance 
in the pertinent literature as most common relations with exchange rates. We include 
output, the price level, the interest-rate spread, the monetary-policy instrument and the 
stock-market index. The selection of variables is motivated by the following theoretical 
considerations: 
The definition of the real exehange rate suggests a relation between the exchange 
rates and the price levels (p).2 Written in logarithmic form it is stated as: 
q = e + p* - p (3.1 ) 
where q denotes the real exchange rate, e the nominal exchange rate, p* the foreign 
price level and p the domestic priee level. Purchasing-power parity implies a constant 
real exchange rate (equal to one) as all fluctuations in the price levels are neutralized 
by the nominal exchange rate. 
The second relation we want to include is stated by the uncovered-interest-rate 
parity (UIP):3 1 +it+1 = (1 +i;+l)Et[e:~~(~:))] or written in approximated, logarithmic 
form: 
(3.2) 
where i t+1 denotes the domestic nominal interest rate on bonds, i;+l the foreign nominal 
interest rate on bonds, Edet+ll the anticipated (future) nominal exchange rate and et 
the current nominal exchange rate. Under the hypothesis that domestic and foreign 
bonds are perfect substitutes and given full international capital mobility, the UIP states 
l'Ne define the real exchange rate as the ratio of domestic over foreign goods. Henceforth and 
in ail graphs we abbreviate it by rExR. 
2Cf. Rogoff (1996), Froot and Rogoff (1994) or Obstfeld and I\ogoff (1996), page 200-202 
3Cf. Baxter (1994), Cumby (1988) or Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), page 527-528 
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that the two bonds can only pay different interest rate if agents expect there will be 
compensating movement in the exchange rate. We use the monetary-policy instrument 
(MPI), which is a very short-term (prime) interest rate of the central bank (Bernanke 
and Blinder, 1992), as the relevant interest rate. 
The third relation we take in consideration is the goods market equilibrium of 
the Mundell-Flemming-Dornbusch model which elaborates a relation between the real 
domestic (national) output (Y) and the real exchange rate.4 It can be written as yf = 
y + o(et - P; + Pt - 7j) or simplified: 
(3.3) 
where yf denotes the demand for domestic output, y the natural (full employment) rate 
of output, qt the real exchange rate and 0 a weighting parameter which we assume to 
take strictly positive values. 
The fifth and sixth variable we want to add to our SVAR concern the presumption 
that news and anticipation about the future of the economy might cause real exchange 
rate fluctuations (Bachetta and Wincoop, 2003). Such information is reflected in (i) the 
stock market (Crise, 2000); and (ii) the interest-rate spread (Kwark, 2002). We therefore 
add the stock-market index (SM!) as the fifth variable. It represents the performance of 
a whole stock market and thereby refiects investors' perceptions of the current and the 
future state of the economy. The sixth variable is the real interest-rate spread (R-sp) 
which is the differential of the long-term interest rate and the short-term interest rate 
and indicates the anticipated progression of the economy. We use the spread instead 
of the simple long-term interest rate to have comparable rates between countries where 
different market risks apply. 
In an earlier version of this thesis, we also considered an eight-variable SVAR 
containing (world) commodity priees and the trade balance to account for the Harrod­
·Cf. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), page 610 
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Balassa-Samulson effect. 5 As both variables are statistically non-significant as sources 
of rExR movements we abstract from them. 
3.3 Data Set 
Data Sources 
Our data collection starts after the Bretton Woods era (post March 1973). Thereby, 
we try to draw conclusions with respect to the widely noted fact that real exchange rates 
have been substantially more volatile after the collapse of this agreement. 
The Canadian dataset is at monthly frequencies for the sample 1973:5 untiI2006:2. 
With one observation lost to differentiating the interest-rate spread (cf. Data construc­
tion) and three more to lagging, the sample size for Canada is T=390. 
The dataset for the emerging countries is different in three aspects: (i) we con­
structed our SVAR for emerging countries only with the price-Ievel differential, the 
interest-rate-spread differential and the output differential as the additional candidate 
variables were not collected for a sufficiently long horizon; (ii) we use quarterly data 
for all emerging countries as monthly data is not available for some variables; and 
(iii) we reduce the sample range to 1980:1 until 2005:4 as, after Bretton Woods, many 
developing and emerging countries did first shift from fixed exchange-rate regimes to in­
ternational reserve assets and only in the late 1970s to floating exchange-rate regimes.6 
Consequently, data is available for a shorter period. With one observation lost to dif­
ferentiating the interest rate and two more to lagging, the sampIe size for emerging 
5 According to this effect, countries with higher productivity in tradable goods -compared to 
non-tradable goods- tend to have higher priee levels. Cf. Harrocl (1933), Balassa (1964) and Samuelson 
(1964) or Obstfeld and ftogoff (1996), page 210-216 
GThe Special Drawing ftight (SDF) of the International Monetary Fund is such an international 
rcserve asset. The SDF is a basket of major currencies against which countries can peg their domestic 
eurrencies. The idea is to diversify the dependence of the trading partners' eurreney fluctuations whieh 
exist in regimes whcre the domcstic currency is pegged to a single foreign currency. 
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countries is T=97. 
We received most of the envisaged time series data form the International Fi­
nancial Statistics (IFS? database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from 
the Main Economie Indicators (MEI)8 database of the Organization for Economie Co­
operation and Development (OECD). Additional data was obtained by national sources: 
Canadian data was provided by the Canadian Socio-Economie Information Management 
System (CANSIM II)9. Mexican data was provided by the Mexican National Institute 
for Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI) 10. Sou th African and Thai data came 
respectively from Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) Il and the National Statistical Of­
fice (NSO)12 of Thailand. U.S. data was received from the Federal Reserve Economie 
Databank (FRED)13 of the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis. 
Data Construction 
Three variables of our model were not directly available and had to be constructed. 
First, monthly data for the CanadianjU.S. real exchange rate had to be ea1culated based 
on equation 3.1. Second, monthly data of Canadian output was not available in one 
single series for our sample horizon; we had to eonstruct it by combining two series that 
7http://imfstatistics.org 
8 http://www.occd.org 
9 http://dcl.chass.utoronto.ca 
IOhttp://www.incgi.gob.mx 
Il http://www.statssa.gov.za 
12 http://www.nso.go.th 
13 http:j j rcscarch.stlouisfed.orgj fred2 
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appear to be highly correlated .14 Third, as the adequate measure of the real interest 
rate is the ex ante interest rate, we would have to account for expected inflation which in 
turn is difficult to determine. Therefore, we simply use the realized rate of the previous 
period: the ex post real interest rate. 
Data Transformation 
We undertook the following data transformation. The domestic variables have 
been divided by the D.S. variables. 15 In addition, we took the logarithm of these ratios 
and multiplied them by 100, exeept of those already expressed in percent. For variables 
given in percent, we calculated the differenees. Specifically: 
1	 Real Exchange Rate: rExR == ln(DomeslicGoods) * 100 
.	 U.S.Goods 
·	 L 1 D'ff . 1 P d'fI' l (DornCSlic Pl' iCeLevcl) 002.	 P nce- eve 1 erentla: - l == n U.S._ PriceLevel * 1 
3.	 Interest-Rate-Spread Differentia!: R-sp-diff ==
 
(Dornes tic _ LongTerrnlnlcl'eslRale - Dorneslic _ ShorlTennlntcl'CSlRalc)
 
(U .S. _ LongTcl'mlnlereslRale - U .S. _ShorlTermlntcrcstRale) 
D 'ff . 1 Y d'ff l (DomeSlic Output) 004.	 Output l erentla: - 1 == n u.s. OulpuL * 1 
5.	 Monetary-Policy-Instrument DifferentiaI:
 
MPI-diff == Domestic_PrimeRale - US._PrirneRale
 
6	 Stock-Market-Index DifferentiaI: SMI-diff == ln( DomesLic SLockMarkcLlndex) * 100 
.	 U.S._StockMarketlndcx 
Priee levels are based on the national consumer-priee indexes (CPI). The short­
term interest rate is the three-month treasury bill. The long-term interest rate is the 
11The series are GDP in 1992 constant prices and GDP in 1997 constant dollars. The correlation 
coefficient of the two series is 0,999264. Cf. figure A.l. 
15This is motivated by the fact that the l'ExIl in this thesis is dcfincd as domcstic goods over 
US-American goods. 
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three-year government bond. Canadian, Mexican, South African and Thai output is the 
real gross domestic product (GDP). D.S. output is industrial production. The Canadian 
monetary-policy instrument is the Overnight Rate (ONR). The D.S. monetary-policy 
instrument is the Federal Funds Rate (FFR). The Canadian stock-market index is the 
Toronto Stock Exchange Composite Index (TSXCI). The D.S. stock-market index is the 
Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500). 
SVAR Specification 
These six variables constitute our mode!. Based on equation 2.6 of the method­
ology chapter and the variable choice, we construct the following SVAR for Canada: 
rExR R(L)ll R(L)16 [;shock1 
P - diff R(Lh1 R(Lh6 [;shock2 
R - sp - dif f R(Lb R(Lb [;shock3 
y - diff R(L)41 R(L)46 [;shock4 
MPI ­ diff R(L)Sl R(L)S6 [;shockS 
SMI ­ diff R(L)61 R(L)66 
6x6 
[;shock6 
According to the Akaike (information) criterion, the dynamics of these variables 
for Canadian data are best described by a SVAR with three lags. 
Our SVAR for Mexico, South Africa and Thailand is represented by: 
[;shock1rExR R(L)ll R(L )14 
[;shock2P - diff R(Lh1 R(Lb 
[;shock3R- sp - diff R(Lb R(Lh4 
[;shock4y - diff R(L)41 R(L)44 
4x4 
This four-variable version is most precise with two lags. 
CHAPTERIV 
RESULTS 
This chapter analyzes our results. We draw conclusions about what moves the 
real exchange rate (section 1) applying Canadian data. A comparison between our 
econometric method with those employing theoretical identification procedures (section 
2) and a series of robustness checks on our model (section 3) complements this chapter. 
4.1 Sources of Exchange Rate Volatility in Canada 
4.1.1 Extracting the Most Important Shocks 
Figure 4.1 shows the historical variance decompositions for the three possible 
rotations of the two shocks explaining most of the forecast-error variance of the rExR. 
The prediction horizon is 20 periods (months) as we focus on short-run volatility. The 
horizontal axis depicts 60 periods to expose the medium and long-run effects as weil. On 
the vertical axis we show the explanatory power of each shock in percent; 1 represents 
100%. The solid line is the median of the resulting posterior distribution and the dotted 
lines are the confidence intervals which are calculated with the (Litterman) Minnesota 
prior for the 10%-90% bounds. 1 
Both shocks together explain a remarkable 96% of the forecast-error variance of 
1The Minnesota Prior assumes that the variables follow a random walle Cf. Litterman (1986) 
or Hamilton (1994), page 360-362 
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the rExR at the time they occur (to) and even 98% two periods later. A closer look 
reveals that their influence decreases only slightly over the prediction horizon and still 
explain 93% in t60. We can say with a high level of confidence that two shocks drive the 
real exchange rate. The two shocks together have the following explanatory power of 
the forecast-error variance of: the price-level differential (26% in to), the interest-rate­
spread differential (9% in to) and the output differential (13% in to). This fact points 
rather towards an approval of the disconnect effect, as the two most important shocks 
for the rExR cio not explain a substantial amount of the volatility in the fundamentals. 
In comparison, our aclditional candidate variables seem more likely to share these 
two shocks: monetary-policy-instrument differential (41% in to) and the stock-market­
index differential (17% in to). Nevertheless, these variables do not share the shocks to 
a substantial part either. 
Among the three rotations (columns two to six), the first one is the most inter­
esting as its shock 1 has the most explanatory power of ail six shocl<s provided. Thus, 
we concentrate only on this shock 1 which alone always explains far more than the 
majority of the rExR fluctuations. It causes approximately 80% of its volatility in to 
and increases to reach its height of 95% in tl2 from where it decrea~es ta about 82% in 
t60. Shock 2 has 16% explanatory power of the forecast-error variance of the rExR in 
to and even less over the horizon (3% in tlO and 5% in t60)' In comparison to shock 1, 
we have to conclude that this shock is not a major driving force of rExR fluctuations. 
Consequently, the following analysis is done for shock 1 (of rotation 1) only. 
Shock 1 explains little of the macro fundamentals in to: price-level differential 
(6%), interest-rate-spread differential (1%) and output differential (3%) and only lit­
tle more of the additional candidate variables: monetary-policy-instrument differential 
(25%) and the stock-market-index differential (2%). Over the medium-run (t20) and 
long-run (t60) t\-vo variables stand out: the output differential (36% in t20; 30% in t60) 
and of stock-market-index differential (42% in t20; 53% in t60). 
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Summary 
Our results reveal that there are two shocks causing virtually ail of the forecast­
error variance of the rExR. This is particularly true during the first twelve periods after 
the impulse of the shock (>95%) but even thereafter, the two shocks drive the rExR 
to a substantial amount (>90%). We find that one of these shocks appears to be the 
major source of the forecast-error variance of the rExR as its explanatory power ranges 
between 75% and 92%. The interpretation of this single shock (shock 1) is our focus. 
We corroborate the exchange-rate disconnect with our model and data; at least 
in the short-run. The main variables output, the priee level and the interest-rate spread 
(ail as differentials) do not seem to substantially share (9%-26%) the two most important 
shocks which drive the rExR. An alternative reading of the fact is that the propagation 
of the shock on the fundamentals is largely damped by monetary policy which would as 
weil explain the response function of the differential of the monetary-policy instruments. 
4.1.2 Evaluating the Impact of the Shocks on Macro Aggregates 
We analyze the (dynamic) impulsc-response functions as they are shown below 
in figure 4.2. As stated earlier, they present the amplitude and propagation of shock 1 
(rotation 1) on each variable of our SVAR. The vertical axis is the percentage change 
representing the volati!ity of a variable; 1 represents a 1% change. The horizontal axis 
is the (60 periods) prediction horizon. As for the variance decomposition, the solid 
line represents the median of the resulting posterior distribution and the dotted !ines 
the confidence intervals which were calculated with the Minnesota Prior for a 10%-90% 
lower bound. The interpretation is done from the Canadian perspective as we hold the 
D.S. variables fixed 2 
Shock 1 does not seem to have a permanent effect on any variable. 
2 As we define the ratios as CANjUSA, an incrcasc in the ratio conscquently implics an incrcasc 
in the value of the Canadian variable. 
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rExR: The real exchange rate depreciates about 0,9% at the time of the occurrence 
(ta) of the shock. Interestingly its response is hump-shaped with a peak (1%) in t3 
and a declining but long-lasting impact over the horizon. The response is statistically 
significant. 
P-diff: From the price-level differential we deduce a deftationary impact of the 
shock, although it is rather modest: -0,1% in ta from where it slowly returns back to 
zero. The response is statistically non-significant. 
R-sp-diff: No significant impa.ct is exerted on the differential of the interest-rate 
spread which is affected to always less than 0,01%. The response is statistically non­
significant. 
Y-diff: The effect on the output differential implies a negative growth effect of 
the shock. The response has a similar hump shape to the rExR. In ta, it is -0,2% which 
doubles until t4 to reach the minimum of -0,4% before it slowly fades out. This response 
is statistically significant for ti and the following periods. 
MPI-diff: The shock has a negative impact on the differential of monetary-policy 
instrument which indicates a decrease in the Canadian prime rate. In ta, the MPI­
diff jumps down about -0,7% before it sharply increases towards zero. The response is 
statistically significant until t3. 
SMI-diff: The differentia.l of the stock-market index shows another very strong 
and extended hump-shaped response. In ta, the effect of the shock is 0,3%. The main 
impact occurs in tl7 (2,4%) from where the response slowly returns back to zero. This 
response is statistically significant from t3 onwards. 
Summary 
The marked and significant reaction of the rExR indicates that (relative) purchasing­
power parity (PPP) does not to hold. The findings support the view often stated in the 
literature that large and persistent deviations from PPP occur (Adler and Lehmann, 
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1983; Aizenman, 1984). We find evidence in the propagation of both shocks. The reason 
is the stickiness of priees which prevents immediate neutralization by the nominal ExR. 
We further conclude that uncovered-interest-rate parity (VIP) does not hold. 
Equation 3.2 rewritten says that the cross-country difference rit - i;] is the same as the 
temporal difference of the ExR [et+l - ell. This is not the case. The amplitude of the 
responses of the rExR and the MPI-diff are not equivalent. This effect is even stronger 
after a few periods, as the rExR returns bacl< to zero slowly and the MPI-diff virtually 
jumps back to zero. There needs to be a risk premium to balance the movements of the 
rExR and the interest rates. 
4.1.3 Interpretation 
Demand Shock: We suspect a demand shock -in real terms- to account for the 
propagation shown by shock 1. A negative demand shock means a fall of government 
spending, or of consumption, or of investment and thus a decrease of output below 
potential. 3 As a result, producers decrease the price level to incite consumption. The 
central bank decreases its prime rate to stimulate growth. The stock market, in turn, 
evaluates the loosening of monetary policy as a sound reaction and foresees positive 
perspectives. As these perspectives become concrete in the subsequent months, the 
stock-market-index differential gradually enhances. The real exchange rate depreciates 
as the decrease price-level differential is not fully absorbed neither by the nominal 
exchange rate nor the effect of the monetary policy. 
Monetary Shock: Our results do not support the idea of a monetary shock. A 
classic monetary shock is induced by an exogenous shock to the monetary-policy in­
strument. If the shock is expansionary, the central bank is decreasing its prime rate. 
The propagation cffects on our variables would be: an increase in the priee level and an 
3We describe the shock as a negative demand shock in order to establish a coherent interpretation 
of th8 propagation of the variables. Dut as aIl shoeks a mean-zero shoeks th8 signs eannot be interpreted 
\Vith e8rtitudc. 
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increase of output. On the one hand, we observe an immediate decrease in the monetary­
policy-instrument differential, but on the other hand, the priee-Ievel differential and the 
output differential behave exactly the opposite as predicted. This is implausible. We 
hence exclude the possibility that shock 1 is a monetary shock. 
Supply Shock: We do not read the results as a supply shock either. Generally, 
a negative supply shock results in a decrease in output (productivity). The impact on 
other variables is the following: an increase of the price level given that supply falls. 
The stock-market index reacts with a slump to such a negative productivity shock. 
Monetary policy is likely to decrease the prime rate to lower the priee level; thus the 
monetary-policy-instrument differential increases. Our results provide a decrease of the 
output differential, but as weil a decrease in the price-level differential, an increase in 
the stock-market-index differential and a decrease in the monetary-policy-instrument 
differential. The behavior of ail these variables is contradictory. Consequently, we may 
exclude the alternative of a supply shock as weil. 
Information Shock: We can rule out an information shock as weil. Departing 
with the increase of the stock-market-index differential, positive information about the 
Canadian economy could be the source of the shock. Such good news could be a fall 
in production costs and a subsequent decrease of the priee level. Falling prices incite 
consumption and thus output rises. The reaction of the monetary authority depends 
on the objective of the bank. Supposing that deflationary effects induee costs would 
make a decrease of the prime rate adequate. A comparison with our graphs shows that 
output falls, which is not coherent, particularly as a decrease of output is not considered 
as good news. We hence rule out the possibility of information shocks. 
Exogenous Exchange Rate Shock: An exogenous shock on the exchange rate is 
another potential option even though it is hard to see why such a shock should be 
truly exogenous. But leaving aside this reservation, suppose that a shock on financial 
markets causes a sudden depreciation of the Canadian dollar. A plausible propagation on 
other variables would be an increase of Cauadian output as Canadian exports become 
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relatively cheaper abroad. The effect on the priee level is ambiguous as the relative 
increase of imported goods might have a less strong effect. In our data, we observe a 
decrease of the rExR but output decreases by remarkable 0,5%. This is implausible in 
the light of the definition given. 
4.2 Robustness Tests 
4.2.1 Comparison to Different Identification Procedures 
As a robustness check of our results, we put the Uhlig approach in competition 
with traditional identification procedures. We want to find out if the Uhlig method 
provides different results for the same dataset and therefore test it against the two 
most important papers in this line of literature: Clarida and Galf's (1994) application 
of long-run restrictions and Eichenbaum and Evans's (1995) application of short-run 
restrictions. 
Long-Run Restrictions versus Uhlig 
Wc begin with a reproduction of the Clarida and Gall (1994) results by imposing 
long-run restrictions. In a second step we generate results with the Uhlig method. The 
Clarida-Galf SVAR contains three variables: the output differential (Y-cliff), the real 
exchange rate (rExR) and the price-level differential (P-diff). The three restrictions 
they impose are: a monetary shock neither has a long-run effect on output nor on the 
rExR and a demand shock has no long-run effect on output. We use Canadian and U.S. 
data for the sample horizon 1973m5 until 2006m2. 
The variance decomposition (cf. figure 4.3) shows that demand shocks are the 
main driving force of the rExR but explain literally nothing of the Y-diff and the P-diff. 
In ta, the rExR is driven to 5% by supply shocks, to 90% by demand shocks and to 
5% by monetary shocks. Over the prediction horizon, the explanatory power of the 
supply shock rises to 30%, the impact of the demand shock falls to 70%. The output 
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Figure 4.3 Variance Decomposition; Clarida and Cali with long-run restrictions 
differential is affected in ta to 96% by the supply shock and to 3% by the demand shock 
while monetary shocks have virtually no explanatory power. The price-level differential 
on the contrary is only very little explained by supply and demand shocks in ta (4%; 
1%) but monetary shocks drive it to a large extend (95% in ta). Our reproduction of 
Clarida and Calî (1994) yields very similar results even though we extended the horizon 
for about 14 years and changed from quarterly to monthly data. 
We analyze the impulse-response functions (cf. figure 4.4) only for the demand 
shock as it has the most explanatory power of the forecast-error variance of the rExR. 
In ta, the rExR depreciates about 1,1% and increases in a hump shape to reach a 
maximum of 1,4% in t3. The output differential increases about 0,2% in ta and fades 
out afterwards. The price-level differential is particularly afi'ected in the medium and 
long-run. In ta, it jumps to approximately 0,05% but it increases to 1% over the 
prediction horizon. 
The Uhlig method yields the following results: the variance decomposition (cf. 
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Figure 4.4 Impulse Response Functions; Clarida and Galf with long-run restrictions 
left part of figure 4.5) reveals that the first shock alone (shock 1) explains 100% of rExR 
fluctuations in ta and over 90% over the five-year prediction horizon. This was found 
by Clarida and Galf as weil. They attributed 93% to demand shocks. That means that 
there is only one major driving force behind the rExR. We analyze this shock 1 only. 
To label shock 1, we first have to look if it is shared by the two other variables. 
The second column of the variance decomposition reveals that in ta, shock 1 does not 
seem to affect neither the price variance nor the output variance significantly which 
further supports the exchange-rate disconnect. vVe turn towards the response functions 
to see how shock 1 affects the variables. 
Our impulse-response functions (cf. right part of figure 4.5) to the two shocks 
show that shock 1 causes a 1% depreciation of the rExR in ta, which is followed by 
a little hump (1,2% aftel' three periods) and a slow decline. In comparison to the 
method imposing long-run restrictions, we find different reactions of the two candidate 
variables: the output differential and the price-level differential are negatively impacted 
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Figure 4.5 Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Functions: Clarida and 
Gali's vs. Uhlig method 
(both about -0,2% in ta). 
We resume that imposing long-l'un restrictions -as Clarida and Gali do- and not 
imposing them -as the Uhlig method suggests- does not lead to strikingly different 
results. The Uhlig method has the disadvantage that labeling shock 1 has to be done 
with a more complex SVAR as three variables are not enough to establish a coherent 
interpretation. But our six-variable SVAR with monthly data proposes the same (de­
mand) shock as Clarida and Galf do. 
Another interpretation of the finding is that there is only one major shock stems from 
the econometrics of the Uhlig method. As the SVAR explains the forecast-error variance 
of the rExR with the error terms, we seem to attribute al! the explanatory power to 
the error term of the rExR. The other two error terms -of the output differential and 
price-level differential- do simply not affect the rExR. That is further support of the 
disconnect. 
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Short-Run Restrictions versus Uhlig 
Next, we verify if imposing monetary policy short-run restrictions -the way Eichen­
baum and Evans (1995) imposed- can be squared with results from the Uhlig method. 
As before, we first reproduce their results for the Canadian case.4 In a second step we 
generate results with the Uhlig method. A particularity of the Eichenbaum-Evans SVAR 
is their choice of variables. Rather than using differentials, they simply utilize log-values. 
Seven variables are included: the real exchange rate (rExR), the U.S. output (US-Y), 
U.S. price level (US-P), Canadian output (CAN-Y), the U.S. short-term interest rate 
(US-R), the Canadian short-term interest rate (CAN-R) and the U.S. monetary-policy 
instrument (US-MPI). Only an U.S. monetary shock is analyzed. We use Canadian and 
U.S. data for the sample horizon 1973m5 until 2006m2. 
Our reproduction of the Eichenbaum and Evans's variance decomposition (cf. 
left part of figure 4.6) shows that a monetary shock has virtually no explanatory power 
of the rExR in ta and only very little over the prediction horizon. The monetary 
shock has -as the literature predicts- much explanatory power of the U.S. interest 
rate and evidently on the U.S. monetary-policy instrument (prime rate). We have to 
conclude that monetary shocks have only very little influence on the rExR volatility.5 
In contrast, Eichenbaum and Evans found in their paper a contribution between 10% 
and 40% according to the country considered. Faust and Rogers (1999) found -in their 
reproduction of Eichenbaum and Evans- a more diffuse impact (2%-56%) of monetary 
shocks on the rExR. Our findings for Canada seem to lie at the lower end of these two 
studies. 
The corresponding impulse-response functions (cf. right part of figure 4.7) display 
~ As Eichenbaum and Evans did not analyze Canada in their papcr. As a check, we first repro­
duced the results for the United Kingdom. As our results matched with theirs', we introduced Canadian 
data. 
"At least according to our data set. for U.S. and Canadian data. If this conclusion !lolds with 
generality has still to be cxamincd. 
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Figure 4.6 Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Functions; Eichenbaum and 
Evans with short-run restrictions 
that monetary shocks lead to virtually no response of the rExR in ta. The effects on the 
candidate variables are the following: the U.S. output, U.S. priees and Canadian output 
are affected by less than 1%. The US interest rate increases by 30% in ta and until 
43% in t5 before decreasing back to zero. The Canadian interest rate is not affected 
in ta but increases sharply during the following periods to reach 20% in t5' The U,S. 
monetary-policy instrument increases by 50% (ta) and even 60% in t3 before it returns 
back to zero. 
Generating results with the Uhlig method yields very different findings, Our 
variance decomposition (cf. left part of figure 4.7) identifies again two shocks which 
explain 96% of the forecast-error variance of the rExR in ta. Three variables of the 
Eichenbaum-Evans SVAR share these two shocks to a relatively large extend at the 
moment of the shock: the U.S, interest rate (35%), the Canadian interest rate (40%) 
and the US monetary-policy instrument (25%), The other variables are as weil affected 
but to a minor degree. This is similar to the results Eichenbaum and Evans generated, 
although the rise in the Canadian interest rate is enigmatic. Looking at one shock only 
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Figure 4.7 Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Functions; Eichenbaum and 
Evans' vs. Dhlig method 
shows that shock l explains 92% of the rExR volatility in ta. The same three variables, 
which were most impacted by the two shocks together, seem to share this shock: the 
D.S. and the Canadian interest rates are explained to 10% in ta· The D.S. monetary­
policy instrument is driven to about 7% in ta. In addition, the D.S. price level is affected 
to 7% in ta. 
Impulse-response functions from the Dhlig method (right part of figme 4.10) for 
shock 1 provide the following results: the impact on the rExR of shock 1 causes a 
depreciation of 1% in ta, which is in contrast to the results of Eichenbaum and Evans. 
We further observe an increase in D.S. output (0,1% in ta). There is an inftationary 
effect on D.S. price level (0,1% in ta) and a fall in Canadian output (0,05% in ta). The 
greatest responses are observed for the D.S. and Canadian interest rates and the D.S. 
monetary-policy instrument. Ail increase by about 0,2% in ta. These movements in 
the variables are quantitatively consistent with those obtained by imposing short-run 
restrictions. 
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We conclude that applying such short-l'un restrictions yields different results. 
The Uhlig method exposes a far more important shock -according to its explanatory 
power- than the monetary shock of Eichenbaum and Evans. Employing their short-run 
restrictions may obscure this most important shock. 
4.2.2 Parameter Variations 
In order to verify if our model provides reliable results, we modify sorne of its 
most important specification parameters. We check robustness along three dimensions: 
(i) The prediction horizon: Throughout this thesis, the prediction horizon k = 
[k,k] is fixed at k=[0,20]. Here we enlarge it to k=60 and k=100; k is always zero. In 
a second test wc change the position of the prediction horizon: it is being lagged away 
from the moment of the shock. Otherwise said, we manipulate [k,k] to take the values 
[40,60] and [80,100]; k continues ta be fixed at 20. 
(ii) The number of variables: The number of variables included in our SVAR is 
changed. Vve reduce the model to five and three variables. The choice of variables which 
we keep in the SVAR is based on their responses in the benchmark case. 
(iii) The time horizon: Clarida and Gall (1994) found that shocks affect the rExR 
to a varying extend over time. We therefore divide our total sample horizon (1973m5­
1990m2) in two: 1973m5-1990m2 and 1990m3-2006m2. 
Ali results are provided in figures in the appendix. The visible horizon is enlarged 
from 60 to 100 periods throughout ail tests for better comparison. 
Analysis of the tests under (i), based on figures A.2, A.3 and A.4: The predic­
tion horizon does not have a significant impact on the results as the impulse-response 
functions and the variance decomposition do not seem to be significantly altered. This 
modification has no effect on the shape, nor on the amplitude of the response functions, 
nor on the explanatory power of the shocks. The only exception is the price-level dif­
ferential which tends to be slightly more driven by the shock if the prediction horizons 
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becomes larger.
 
Figures A.2, A.5 and A.6 show the results if the position of the prediction horizon
 
changes: neither the response functions, nor the variance decomposition are changed
 
significantly.
 
Analysis of the tests under (ii), based on figures A.2, A.7 and A.8: Our SVAR 
depends lightly on the number of variables involved as the variance decompositions 
reveal evidence that the explanatory power of shocks increases as the number of variables 
is reduced. This is not surprising due to the underpinnings of a SVAR: the SVAR 
explains the volatility of each variable with error terms in the system. Evidently, the 
less variables we keep in the SVAR, the more we explain the forecast-error variance 
of each variable. In the extreme case of just one variable, we would always find 100% 
explanatory power in the variable's own error term. 
Analysis of the tests under (iii), based on figures A.2, A.9 and A.lO: The time 
horizon is highly influential for the results. We are thus able to support another finding 
of Clarida and Gali (1994). The left part of figure A. 9 reveals that ail variables share the 
shocks on the rExR to a larger extend for the period 1973m5-l990m2; particularly after 
some lags. The impulse-response functions (right part of figure A.9) differ substantially 
to those of figure A.2; except the R-sp-diff. In contrast, figure A.lD looks relatively 
similar to figure A.2. Only the P-diff shares the shocks to a greater extend. The 
impulse-response functions (right part of figure A.lD) are changed in the following: the 
rExR returns faster to zero, the output differential increases in ta and differential of 
monetary-policy instruments decreases less in ta and the stock-market-index differential 
is affected negatively in ta· 
CHAPTER V 
COMPARISON TO EMERGING COUNTRIES 
As above, we use variance decompositions to separate the different shocks driving 
the real exchange rate. Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show these variance decompositions for 
three emerging countries: Mexico, South Africa and Thailanù. We chose these three 
countries as they are undoubtedly emerging and due to their regional importance. The 
reference country is the USA. 'vVe only present the first out of three rotations as it 
is the most interesting for all three countries. The horizontal axis depicts the forecast 
horizon in quarters and the vertical axis the explanatory power of each shock in percent. 
The confidence intervals are calculated with the Minnesota Prior for a 10%-90% lower 
bound. 
5.1 Mexico 
The variance decomposition depicts two shocks which explain together 100% of 
the forecast-error variance of the rExR in ta and over the prediction horizon. One of 
these shocks (shock 1) causes virtually al! of (>97%) the fluctuations while the second 
shock (shock 2) has very little (1%-3%) explanatory power. We therefore analyze only 
shock 1. The three main macroeconomic variables are affected (on average) to a modest 
extend in ta by shock 1: the price-level differential shares the shock to 25%, the interest­
rate-spread differential to 10% and the output differential only to 2%. 
The impulse-response functions show a remarkable 9,3% depreciation of the Mex­
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Figure 5.1 Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Functions; Mexico/USA 
ican Peso in ta, which gradually returns back to zero. Our three main variables are 
ail affected negatively: the price-level differential jumps down -3,7% (ta) and strongly 
increases until tl3 to attain a maximum of 6%. The interest-rate-spread differential 
decreases in ta by -1,1% before it returns to zero and the output differential first falls 
abou t -0,34% (ta) and decreases further until -1,1 % (ts) to return to zero afterwards. 
Particularly, the responses of the rExR and the differential of price levels are remark­
able. They indicate high volatility, maybe induced by the financial (Tequila) crisis in 
1994 (cf. Lederman, Menéndez, Perry and Stiglitz, 2001). 
5.2 South Africa 
We determine -by variance decomposition- again two shocks which induce virtu­
ally 100% of the rExR variance in ta. Their explanatory power falls about 2% at the 
end of the horizon. The second column presents the impact of shock 1 and we see that 
this shock drives the rExR to 93% in ta. The second shock contributes only 7% and will 
therefore not be considered further. The core macroeconomic variables do not share 
shock 1 at the time it occurs. The price-level differential is driven to 3% by this shock, 
the interest-rate-spread differential to 2% and the output differential to less than 1%. 
The impulse-response functions show a depreciation of the rExR of about 6,2% 
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Figure 5.2 Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Functions; South 
Africa/USA 
and a graduaI decline thereafter. The two additional variables increase as well in ta due 
to shock 1. The price-level differential goes up about 0,16%, then falls to -0,6% (hs) 
and finally returns back to zero. Interest-rate-spread differential and output differential 
increase rather modestly (0,05% and 0,1%, respectively) and return to zero after a few 
periods. These responses do not resemble to those due to a demand shock. Except for 
the rExR, the three variables are statistically non-significant. 
5.3 Thailand 
As in the cases before, both shocks together account for the total of the forecast­
error variance of the rExR in ta. Theil' explanatol'Y power falls about 9% at the end 
of the horizon. Shock 1 is again of particular interest as it causes 95% of the rExR 
volatility in ta whereas the second shock contributes only 5%. The most important 
shock for rExR movements does not seem to be shared by the main variables. Shock 
1 has 3% explanatory power on the price-Ievel differential and only 1% on the interest­
rate-spread differential and the output differential, respectively. 
For Thailand, all four variables show a positive response to the shock at ta. 
The rExR increases by 6,2%, the price-level differential by about 0,12% (hump in t3: 
------
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Figure 5.3 Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Functions; ThailandjUSA 
0,18%), the interest-rate-spread differential by 0,05% and the output differential by 
approximately 0,1%. They al! return back to zero quickly. 
5.4 Summary 
For al! three countries, we find two shocks which contribute (almost) 100% to 
the forecast-error variance of the rExR in to· One of these shocks appears to be the 
sole driving force (95%-99%). Labeling the shocks is difficult due to the fact that we 
have only three variables to draw conclusions from. Moreover, the responses due to 
the shocks vary across countries. We do not think that the exchange rates in al! four 
countries are driven by demand shocks. The impact of country-specifie shocks might 
have more weight in emerging countries. 
For two countries (South Afriea and Thailand), the main maeroeeonomie variables 
as priee level, interest-rate spread and output (al! as differentials) do not share the most 
important shock (1%-3%). Mexiean data provokes suspicion as the variables are affeeted 
by mueh more (2%-25%), but do neither represent a substantial amount. 
The effeet of the shoek on the rExR is between five to nine times greater in the 
three emerging eountries than in Canada, but it vanishes faster, too. 
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5.5 Interpretation 
We conclude that the exchange-rate disconnect is found in data from emerging 
countries as weil. Our impression of this country panel is that the disconnect is even 
more extreme for emerging countries. 
The link between the shock and the rExR is much stronger for emerging countries 
as the induced responses are of much greater amplitude. Supposing the shock is the 
same in industrialized and emerging countries, means that the rExR is more volatile in 
the latter. This fact is consistent with empirical observations (Gray and Irwin, 2003). 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis outlined an application of the Uhlig method to determine the sources 
of real exchange rate fluctuations. We have shown its characteristics and advantages 
and tested its robustness in comparison to traditional methods. Our panel of Canada, 
Mexico, South Africa, Thailand and the United States has determined one principal 
shock which causes a vast amount of the fluctuations of the real exchange rate. Vve read 
this shock -at least for the case of Canada- as a demand shock. Furthermore, we find 
evidence that purchasing-power parity and uncovered-interest-rate parity are violated. 
The exchange-rate disconnect is undoubtedly present in our results. Great disparities 
in the extend of the disconnect seem to exist though. They appear to be greater in 
emerging economies than in industrialized countries. This finding confirms earlier work 
(Kandil, 2004). 
This line of research (including this thesis) has to be read with caution as there 
are many caveats about econometric modeling and choice parameters (Rudebusch, 1998; 
Uhlig, 2005). We have outlined the differences in the results due to the application of 
a theoretical identification procedure. Particular restrictions, the choice of candidate 
variables, specifie countries and sample horizons seem to influence the output of SVARs. 
We avoided theoretical identification procedures but the method we used instead is new 
and needs to be tested further to assure its robustness. The countries we chose is new 
material as well, but we hope to stimulate the use of emerging and developing countries 
in empirical research. 
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